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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 23 Winter 2005-2006 Number 1
ELEVENTH ANNUAL LLOYD K. GARRISON
LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global
Warming, Terrorism, and Other Problems,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. I had a fan-
tastic afternoon on the premises. I'm really grateful for the
warmth and the substantive conversations.
What I'm going to be focusing these comments on is some-
thing called the precautionary principle. And if you haven't heard
of the precautionary principle, you will before long. The precau-
tionary principle is very popular in Europe. It is an idea for or-
ganizing environmental protection and regulation of risk in
general. The United States in the last few years has fought hard
against the precautionary principle on grounds that are occasion-
ally obscure. But one thing that we can say is that the United
States, in the last few years, has in one sense firmly endorsed the
precautionary principle. In defending the Iraq War and many
measures to fight against terrorism, the United States empha-
sized that you don't need certainty that harm will occur; you
1. This is a lightly edited transcript of the lecture Professor Sunstein delivered
at Pace University School of Law on April 25, 2005. The lecture drew heavily on three
works: Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2006); CAss SUNSTEIN, LAws OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005);
and Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003
(2003) [hereinafter Beyond the Precautionary Principle].
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science.
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should take preventive action because of the risk that harm will
occur. The basic idea behind the precautionary principle is that
we should build a margin of safety into our decisions-an idea
that environmentalists in Europe emphasize in thinking about
global warming, in thinking about destruction of the ozone layer,
in thinking about clean air and clean water in general.2 With re-
spect to terrorism, the Iraq War was explicitly defended on the
grounds that we need a margin of safety in all decision-making.
The White House did not believe that Saddam Hussein definitely
had weapons of mass destruction. It thought that there was some
probability that he had weapons of mass destruction, and that
that was enough to justify action.
I'm going to be making three suggestions here. The first is
that the precautionary principle is incoherent. Risks are on all
sides of social situations. It's just not possible to take precautions
against all of them at the same time. So what Europe celebrates
is an unfortunate basis for environmental and other decision-mak-
ing, because it leads to paralysis and not to environmental
protection.
My second claim is that the precautionary principle gives the
misleading appearance of helpfulness just because of the way the
human mind works. When we think about risks-and maybe this
will resonate with your experience in the last six months and pos-
sibly in the next six months-when we think about risks, human
minds tend to single out one or two from the background and fix-
ate on them without thinking about the extent to which efforts to
reduce the risks on which we're fixating may give rise to risks of
their own. So if you think, I'm nervous about going into a bad
neighborhood at night, I think I'll stay home, it may be that stay-
ing home introduces its own risks with respect to health or other-
wise. So what I'm going to suggest is that the precautionary
principle, which is incoherent, gives the appearance of coherence
and usefulness because human minds select some of the universe
of relevant risks.
Those are negative claims. Those are points against our
friends in Europe. The third claim is an effort to rescue the pre-
2. See, e.g., INDOR GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL AP-
PRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 5 (2001) ("'In order to protect the envi-
ronment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities'" (quoting U.N. Conference on Environment & Development (UN-
CED), June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle
15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Principle 15])).
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cautionary principle by suggesting that if we focus on a subset of
risks, including environmental risks, we can make progress to-
ward a more sensible way of orienting our laws and policies. And
the subset that I'm going to identify includes those risks that are
irreversible and catastrophic. Hence my title, Irreversible and
Catastrophic-my cheerful title-the thought being that irreversi-
ble and catastrophic risks are ones against which we ought to take
precautions, and those are the ones for which the precautionary
principle is sensible. The rest is just going to be footnotes. But in
law-professor fashion, there are going to be a lot of footnotes and
they're going to be pretty long. So here goes.
Footnote one: What is the precautionary principle with which
I started? There are some versions that are weak and there are
some versions that are strong. The weak version suggests that a
lack of decisive evidence of harm ought not to be a ground for re-
fusing to regulate. Think for example about smoking and tobacco
regulation in the 1960s. Then, we didn't have decisive evidence
that smoking was going to cause cancer, but sensible people didn't
smoke on the ground that they were going to build a margin of
safety into their decision by saying, The fact that there isn't defin-
itive evidence isn't a reason to refrain from precaution. So the
1992 Rio Declaration involving climate change says, "'lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."'
3
Think for example about global warming or air pollution or water
pollution, where we don't have a full sense of how large the harm
is.
The ministerial declaration of an international conference on
the protection of the North Sea is in the same weak vein: "'[A]
precautionary principle is necessary which may require action to
control inputs of [dangerous] substances even before a causal link
has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence."'
4
Straightforward and sensible.
Here's a stronger version, from a group of environmentalists
in the 1990s: "When an activity raises threats of harm to human
3. BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 348 (Hugh Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001)
(quoting Principle 15, supra note 2).
4. Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1, 3 (Julian Morris ed., 2000) (quoting Second Interna-
tional Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (SICPNS), Ministerial Declara-
tion (1987)).
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health or the environment, precautionary measures should be
taken, even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully
established scientifically. In this context, the proponent of the ac-
tivity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof."5 It
should be clear that that's a stronger version because it puts the
burden of proof on those who want to expose people to risk. This
version doesn't merely say lack of certainty of harm is not a reason
for refraining from regulation. So the proponent of an activity
bears the burden of proof.
In Europe, it's sometimes said that a margin of safety must be
built into all decision-making. 6 And think of that as the strong
version of the precautionary principle-a margin of safety in all
decision-making. So, in one European understanding, "[A]ction
should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence
that harm may occur.. . ."7 The possibility that harm may occur
is a justification for corrective action.
And, "The precautionary principle mandates where there is a
risk of significant damage to others or to future generations, then
decisions should be made so as to prevent such activities from be-
ing conducted unless and until scientific evidence shows that the
damage will not occur."8 That doesn't build a margin of safety. It
doesn't just shift the burden of proof. It says that it must be
shown by a proponent of action that damage will not occur.
The weak version-that is the version that says lack of full
scientific certainty isn't a reason to refrain from action-is fine
and good. I don't have anything to say against that. What I'm
going to try to criticize as incoherent is the strong version, that is,
the version that requires a demonstration of absolute safety by the
proponents of the activity.
Now, to get at the problem we need some examples. And let
me just give four in which the precautionary principle has been
invoked, both in the United States and in Europe, as a basis for
thinking about environmental protection. One example, obvi-
5. Id. at 5 (citation omitted). A strong version is defended in Carolyn Raffen-
sperger & Peter L. deFur, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Rigorous Sci-
ence and Solid Ethics, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 933 (1999).
6. See LOMBORG, supra note 3, at 349.
7. Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note 1, at 1013 (quoting Paul
McFedries, Precautionary Principle, WordSpy, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://www.
logophilia.conWordSpy/precautionaryprinciple.asp).
8. The Cloning of Humans and Genetic Modifications: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder,
President, Friends of the Earth).
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ously, is genetic engineering of organisms. Many people who like
the precautionary principle (especially in Europe, and there's a
movement to this effect in the United States), say that genetic
modifications of organisms give rise to risks.9 We don't know their
magnitude. In the view of some people, we should take a precau-
tionary approach and not allow genetic engineering. 10
Nuclear power is another one, where the halting of nuclear
power plants in the United States in the last couple of decades has
been driven in part by a precautionary idea that nuclear power
gives rise to serious risks.11
Global warming is an area where the United States' perceived
intransigence has been criticized in Europe for failing to be pre-
cautionary. It's not clear that global warming will occur in a way
that's extremely damaging, or at least some people so think. And
that, Europeans say, is not a reason for refraining from action; the
fact that it's a possible risk means that we should take very ag-
gressive regulatory action. 12
The Bush Administration's most controversial early decision,
see if you remember this, involved arsenic in drinking water, in
which the Bush Administration suspended the Clinton Adminis-
tration's proposal, which was to reduce arsenic levels from fifty
parts per billion to ten parts per billion. 13
In all four of those areas, the precautionary principle is said
to require aggressive protection. What I'm going to try to argue is
that that's just not so, that for each of these problems the precau-
tionary principle forbids the very steps that it requires. Let's go at
it first by thinking about genetic engineering of food and arsenic.
Genetic engineering of food, it's true, gives rise to risk; and the
precautionary principle calls for precautions against risk. The
problem is, if we don't allow genetic engineering of food, we will
give rise to risks of starvation; because there's some hope, specula-
9. See Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance, the Precautionary Principle, and
the Regulation of Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decision-
making, in BATTLING RESISTANCE To ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES 184, 185 (Ramanan
Laxminarayan ed., 2003).
10. See GOKLANY, supra note 2, at 55.
11. Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Power, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc-generation/newnuc2.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005) ("No
new commercial reactors have come on line in the United States since Watts Bar 1 in
1996.").
12. See, e.g., Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks,
7 J. ECON. PERSPS. 65, 76 (1993).
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L. J. 2255, 2257,
2261, 2269, 2298 (2002).
2005-20061
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tive to be sure, that genetic engineering of food can deliver safe
and nutritious and inexpensive food to countries where this is lit-
erally lifesaving. 14 A ban on genetic engineering of food is literally
dangerous to people who have a great deal to gain from genetic
modification. So my suggestion is that the precautionary principle
forbids genetic modification of food because it gives rise to risk,
but the precautionary principle also forbids forbidding of genetic
engineering of food because forbidding genetic engineering of food
gives rise to risk.
Let's explore another example: arsenic. The former head of
the Environmental Protection Agency, Administrator Christine
Whitman, said in the early days of trying to defend the suspension
of regulation, that there's something we're worried about, which is
the expense of the rule that costs $210 million, and for some water
systems that burden is going to be very hard.15 And for some
users of water that's going to be very expensive-up to $400 per
year or more.16 And what we're worried about is they're going to
stop relying on their water companies and they're going to start
using wells, local wells.' 7 What worries us about those local wells
is that they are contaminated.' 8 What Administrator Whitman
argued, and it wasn't an implausible worry (it may have been
wrong, but it wasn't implausible), was that the arsenic regulation
would give rise to risks of its own in the form of increased use of
highly contaminated, dirty well water.
Now, mind you, for the purposes of the precautionary princi-
ple, the mere fact that the Administrator has legitimate concerns
should be decisive. Remember? The burden of proof switches-
the possibility that harm may occur is the reason for the invoking
of the principle. The arsenic regulation stands both mandated
and condemned by the precautionary principle. Mandated, be-
cause there's a risk of cancer from levels of arsenic in drinking
water that President Bush was thinking of allowing.19 But the
14. See Chantal Pohl Nielson & Kym Anderson, Golden Rice and the Looming
GMO Trade Debate: Implications for the Poor 19 (Ctr. for Int'l Econ. Stud., Discussion
Paper No. 0322, 2003), available at http://adelaide.edu/au/cies/papers/0322.pdf.
15. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 2294-95.
16. See id. at 2294.
17. See News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Interview with Christine Whitman (PBS tele-
vision broadcast Apr. 17, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
white-house/jan-june0l/whitman_4-17.html.
18. See id.
19. Cat Lazaroff, Bush Administration Throws Out New Arsenic Standard, ENV'T
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 20, 2001, http://ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2001/2001-03-20-
06.asp.
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precautionary principle also forbids the very regulation because it
gives rise to substitute risks.
Think for a moment, if you would, about nuclear power and
global warming, my other two examples. Nuclear power seems
condemned by the precautionary principle. But its proponents say
the following: If you're really worried about air pollution and
global warming, you ought to rely on nuclear power, which is
much better than fossil fuels which come from coal-fired power
plants. 20 So they say that aggressive regulation of nuclear power
runs afoul of the precautionary principle because it gives rise to
risks in the form of increased reliance on coal-fired power plants,
which make the air dirty and which contribute to global warming.
Forbidding nuclear power seems required by the precautionary
principle, and in a way it is. But forbidding nuclear power is also
unacceptable under the precautionary principle because if you for-
bid nuclear power, you're going to increase reliance on coal-fired
power plants.
What I'm saying with these examples-genetic modification,
nuclear power, and arsenic-is that risks are on all sides of social
situations. Not just one. If you push against one risk, it's inevita-
ble that you'll be giving rise to another risk. This should be famil-
iar in everyday life. Think, for example, of that risk-avoidance
strategy called "staying at home all day." Probably not very good
for your health. Or think, for example, of the strategy of driving,
rather than flying, for those who fear the risks associated with
airplanes. Driving is risky, too. There is no way of avoiding risks.
What about global warming? Well, the simple fact is that
regulations, especially in poor countries, that cost a lot to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions, will increase-significantly-expendi-
tures.21 And if the expense is high enough, those expenditures
will give rise to risks, for example in the form of dying of too much
heat-if energy prices increase, you might not be able to afford
fans or air-conditioning. That last point about global warming
suggests that the very fact that risk regulation is often expensive
creates risks of its own. 22 And in fact, there are studies sug-
20. See Nuclear Energy Institute, Environmental Preservation, http://www.nei.
orglindex.asp?catnum=2&catid=38 (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
21. See Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New
Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43 (1994).
22. See Robert W. Hahn et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (AEI-
Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Stud., 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=259786.
2005-2006]
7
10 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
gesting that in the United States, every time the government re-
quires industry to spend $10 million to $30 million, at least one
person dies.23 The mechanism by which the multi-million dollar
expenditure produces death isn't agreed upon,24 but think for ex-
ample of the simple fact that a very expensive regulation will
probably increase unemployment and therefore poverty, neither of
which is good for your health. So my suggestion is that under the
precautionary principle (which forbids government from allowing
possible risk to occur), any regulation of an environmentally risky
activity is both required by the precautionary principle and forbid-
den by the precautionary principle for the simple reason that it
imposes a possible risk of death, against which we ought to take
precautions.
So this is why I suggest that the precautionary principle, in
its strong forms, is incoherent. It can be made sensible only if we
single out some subset of the risks that social situations present.
But it's impossible to be universally precautionary. We can be
precautionary with respect to some risks, but not with respect to
risks in general. And if this seems implausible, try it. Try to be
precautionary in general in the next day or two. Chances are that
precautions will give rise to the very risks that precautions
induce.
Why then are Europeans and many others excited about the
precautionary principle? I suggest that the precautionary princi-
ple becomes operational because of the way human minds work,
and more particularly, because in assessing risks we tend to rely
on something that has an elaborate name-but it's a pretty
straightforward idea-called the "availability heuristic." The
availability heuristic says that we assess risks by thinking about
the ease with which we can recall an example in which the risk
came to fruition. 25 So if we don't know a lot about certain situa-
tions, we ask, Can we think of an example in which the risk
occurred?
Here's a simple way of illustrating the use of the availability
heuristic: Suppose that you ask people how many words on a page,
23. Michael Gough, Ph.D, "Environmental Cancer" Isn't What We Thought or
Were Told (Mar. 6, 1997), http://cato.org/testimony/ct-mg030697.html (written testi-
mony before Senate Cancer Coalition).
24. See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 21, at 49 tbl.1.
25. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISITCS AND BIAsEs 3,
11-14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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a random page, have as the last three letters "ing." Most people
tend to say twenty, twenty-five, fifteen. If you ask people how
many words on this page have as the second-to-last letter "n," peo-
ple say four, five. The reason is that it's easy to think of "ing"
words, but not easy to think of words that have as the second-to-
last letter "n." So, too, in thinking about whether something gives
rise to risks: Available instances often drive judgments.
An example is a recent cross-national study of risk from ter-
rorism and risk from SARS, the illness that struck Canada, and
China much worse, in the last few years. 26 The studies found that
Americans believed that the terrorism risk is much higher than
the SARS risk, and Canadians just the opposite.27 The disparity
was so large that it couldn't easily be justified by reference to real-
ity.28 It's just that Americans have an acute sense, because of the
September 11th attacks, of the risk of terrorism, and the sense of
the risk is probably wildly inflated. People tend to think that the
chance that they, themselves, will die in a terrorist attack next
year is about 8 percent-far too high29-whereas we don't have
experiences with SARS. So the fact that terrorism is available
cognitively and comes to our minds, and SARS doesn't, helps to
drive judgments.
A study of risk perceptions, in the sense of public concerns
about risks in the United States for the past thirty years or so,
showed-and this is a happy fact-that our concern about risks
basically tracks fluctuations in real risks.30 So as certain risks
increase, people are more worried, and as other risks decrease,
people are less worried. But there was one exception to this happy
finding, which is panic bred by vivid illustrations in which harm
came to fruition.31 So the mistakes, in which people had an un-
justly inflated sense of risk, came from fear of suicide, fear of
herpes, and fear of AIDS, in contexts in which the vivid new exam-
ple made people far more scared than reality warranted. 32 So the
conclusion is when people got it wrong, it was because a particu-
larly vivid case received considerable media attention.33
26. See generally Neil Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risk:
A Cross-National Comparison, 69 Mo. L. REV. 991 (2004).
27. See id. at 996.
28. See id. at 1008.
29. See id. at 996.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Feigenson et al., supra note 26, at 996.
33. Id.
2005-20061
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A study of Kenya and Malawi tried to figure out when people
are worried about and taking precautions against AIDS.34 When
do they use in their own behavior precautionary principles to
guard against the AIDS risk? The answer was clear: Had they
observed or heard about an illness or death?35 The availability
heuristic drove people's risk assessment.
My suggestion is, when the United States takes precautions
against the risks posed by terrorism, we're not following the pre-
cautionary principle in the abstract; it's because that particular
risk is available to our minds. When Europeans are especially
concerned about mad-cow disease or other risks, it's because those
are the risks that are cognitively available to them. I am sug-
gesting that Europe does not in fact practice precaution in gen-
eral-that it's not a possibility. It adopts a precautionary
principle against a particular subcategory of risks that are readily
available to European thinking, just because of their own recent
experiences.
Okay, that's the end of that footnote, which ends with the
claim that it is not possible to be precautionary in general-Eu-
rope isn't. The apparent workability of the precautionary princi-
ple rests on the fact that human minds naturally fixate on some
sets of risks and not on others. When in the context of genetic
modification of food, many people are nervous about the risks
posed by genetic modification-and it does pose risks-they are
fixating on those, and are ignoring the risks posed by refusing to
use a technology that has a lot of promise.36 I'm not suggesting
that we go forward with genetic modification more than we al-
ready have, or that those who like it are right and those who don't
like it are wrong. I'm only suggesting that the precautionary prin-
ciple isn't a helpful entry into the debate.
Okay, now these footnotes have been destructive. Now we're
going to try to get constructive. What I'm going to try to do is to
figure out a way in which the precautionary principle can be made
34. See Jere R. Behrman et al., Social Networks, HIVIAIDS, and Risk Perceptions
1 (Penn. Inst. for Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 03-007, 2003), available at http:l!
ssrn.com/abstract=382844.
35. See id. at 18-19.
36. See the discussion of risk-related tradeoffs in John D. Graham & Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK Vs. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECT-
ING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 1-41 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wie-
ner eds., 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in RISK AND REASON:
SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 133, 133-52 (2002); Nielson & Anderson, supra
note 14.
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workable for purposes of environmental law and environmental
protection, possibly with regulation in general, conceivably even
for human life.
A first way of trying to get at this might be to suggest that in
the environmental context there's a distinctive argument for a
precautionary principle. Meaning, there is an argument that
would say that environmental risks in particular deserve precau-
tionary thinking, even if risks in general don't and can't. The idea
might be that environmental risks are frequently long-term risks
and not short-term risks-which is to say incidents of their occur-
rence won't readily come to mind like the risks associated with
workplace accidents-and also that the risks often are faced by a
lot of people at once in the form of a statistical probability, rather
than a concentrated group of people who are organized. In addi-
tion, environmental risks are often faced by wildlife and animals,
which don't have a voice in environmental protection. You might
say, for these reasons, there is a kind of a built-in problem, which
is that environmental risks will receive less attention than they
deserve. It's possible.
But I want to try to build up a coherent precautionary princi-
ple more narrowly by focusing on the problems of irreversibility
and potential catastrophe. Let's notice that some subsets of the
risks that the human species faces are irreversible if they come to
fruition-meaning that if they happen, they happen permanently
or they can't be stopped except at extraordinary cost. Extinction
of species from which human beings benefit or not, or which are
important to human beings for moral or other reasons-that's per-
manent. It's an irreversible risk. Genetic modification has three
irreversible risks associated with it, one of which is its effect on
pest resistance; that may be either literally irreversible or ex-
tremely costly to reverse.37 The risks associated with global
warming have an irreversible feature in that carbon dioxide is in
the atmosphere for a long, long time-hundreds of years.38 So
what we're doing now will face future generations; unless technol-
ogies change, there's not much they can do about that.
37. See Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops Under Uncer-
tainty: A Real Option Approach, in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTI-
CIDES, supra note 9, at 214, 215-16.
38. See ARIC Atmosphere, Climate & Environment Information Programme, Car-
bon Dioxide, http://www.ace.mmu.ac.uk/Resources/Teaching-PacksfKey-Stage_4/Cli-
mateChange/02t.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
2005-2006]
11
14 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
It just so happens that some formulations of the precaution-
ary principle are alert to this point. The United Nations Economic
Conference for Europe in 1992 said, "'Where there are threats of
... irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing ... measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation."' 39 The final declaration of the first Euro-
pean Seas at Risk Conference says that "'if the worst case scenario
for a certain activity is serious enough, then even a small amount
of doubt as to safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking
place,"' with clear emphasis in context on the irreversible nature
of the worst-case scenario.40
One way to get at the problem of irreversibility is just to no-
tice that when human beings are asked how much they value en-
vironmental goods, they tend to put their values into three
separate categories: (1) How much would you value to use the
good? Call it a pristine area or a beach. And then there's a dollar
amount: (2) How much would you be willing to pay to have an
option to use the good in the future? Then there's an amount
that's separate and not identical to the amount that people would
pay to use the good. And (3), there's also an amount that people
would be willing to pay to maintain the existence of the good.
What I want to emphasize here is that people are willing to pay
something to have an option to prevent a harm that could prove to
be irreversible in the future.
If we notice the existence of option value, we can just say that
when a decision, a regulatory decision, involves uncertainty about
what the future will bring, and when it's possible to resolve the
uncertainty as time goes on, and when one or more alternatives is
irreversible, it just makes a lot of sense to pay something extra to
protect against the irreversible bad outcome. So my suggestion is,
if there's an irreversible harm on the one side and a reversible one
on the other, we should pay the extra amount to protect ourselves
against the irreversible harm.
What might this mean concretely? Well, I've referred to
global warming as a problem of irreversibility. People do dispute
the nature of the threat from global warming. And so it's tempt-
ing to say what President Bush has said, which is that we should
wait to regulate until we have more information. Often it does
39. GoKLANY, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting Principle 15, supra note 2).
40. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under
Uncertainty, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2002).
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make sense to say, if you don't know the magnitude of the prob-
lem, you should wait until you have clearer information about it
before spending money to prevent it. But in the context of global
warming, there's a big problem with waiting, which is the irre-
versible effect of greenhouse gas emissions on atmospheric con-
centrations of those gases.41 So if we make emission cuts now,
we're essentially purchasing an option to enable global warming
to be stopped or slowed in the future at a lower cost. The basic
idea is that because of the irreversible nature of carbon dioxide
emissions, to expend resources now serves to protect the future
wealth by reducing their costs.
This is just to describe a narrow version of the precautionary
principle. Let's call it the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Princi-
ple, which doesn't run afoul of the problem of incoherence, which
doesn't depend on any selectivity in human minds, depending on
whether examples are evident. It just draws attention to a dis-
tinctive feature of certain kinds of risks-environmental risks and
some risks posed by terrorists.
Now let's shift from the problem of irreversible harm to the
problem of catastrophic harm. Let's try to figure out how to make
these go away, these harms, or to protect the human race against
them. Let's have a little thought experiment. And if I had paper
or a mind-reading machine, or had enough paper to pass out to
you, we actually could find the answers. But think, if you will,
about the following problem: Which do you think is a higher prior-
ity-a one-in-ten risk that 2000 people will die? Or a one-in-one-
million chance that 200 million people will die? Suppose that the
government is deciding between two programs: one that will elimi-
nate a one-in-ten risk that 2000 people will die, and one that will
eliminate the one-in-a-million risk that 200 million people will die.
Which should the government choose? They cost the same.
One question you might ask yourself, if you're the President
of the United States is, Which of those should you give higher pri-
ority to? Another question you might ask yourself is, What do you
think most people would say in answering that question?
I've now asked hundreds of people that question, and the an-
swer is clear. The vast majority of people think that the one-in-a-
million chance of 200 million deaths is lower priority. Most people
think the one-in-ten chance of 2000 deaths deserves more atten-
tion than the one-in-one-million chance of 200 million deaths.
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 161 (2004).
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There are a couple of ways to think about this public judg-
ment that the higher probability of that outcome is worth more
than the very low probability catastrophe. The first thing to think
of, if we're economists, involves expected value.42 And let's just
notice that the two problems I gave have identical expected val-
ues: 200 lives. Each involves 200 lives. So if human beings con-
sider the one-in-ten chance of 2000 deaths to be higher priority
than the tiny chance of 200 million deaths, there's possibly some-
thing wrong there. On standard accounts of rationality, they
should be treated the same. That's the first cut of the problem:
that there seems to be something in human cognition that some-
times treats tiny probabilities, even of extreme disaster, as worth
less than their expected value. 43 And maybe the United States'
caution about global warming has something to do with the under-
valuing of low risks of catastrophe.
But I think it's worse than that-that people's answers are
even worse than they seem. Think for a moment what it would
mean for 200 million people to die. Would that be a simple arith-
metic multiplier of 2000 people dying-is it just a matter of ad-
ding the right number of zeroes? Probably it's a lot worse than
that. If 200 million Americans die-and that's what I've given in
the survey-then, our nation is devastated. What kind of institu-
tions would we have if two-thirds of our country is lost? What kind
of government could we have? How many generations would it
take to replicate the system we now have? Two hundred million
deaths is a lot worse than adding the relevant zeros to 2000. And
human beings seem not easily to understand that fact.
This is just a suggestion that catastrophic risks deserve some
kind of precautionary principle, if only to overcome the human
tendency to treat them as worth less than their expected value, if
you simply do the multiplication; and worth much less than their
real expected value, if you consider the ancillary effects. In some
domains we want to be risk averse. That is, we want to build in a
big margin of safety. And for a risk of catastrophic harm, that
makes a lot of sense.
I am attempting to sketch a distinctive precautionary princi-
ple. It has a name, which won't surprise you: the Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle. And the Catastrophic Harm Pre-
cautionary Principle is intended as a narrow replacement for the
42. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 25, at 14-18.
43. See Gary H. McClelland et al., Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards: A Bi-
modal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 95, 102 (1993).
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precautionary principle. We have to make a few qualifications.
One is that if you make efforts to reduce catastrophic harm, you
might give rise to catastrophic risk just by doing that. It's possi-
ble. And so the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle some-
times does run into the incoherence problem.
Example: the Iraq War. Put to one side the question whether
you're for it or against it. The Iraq War was best defended on the
grounds that it averted a catastrophic harm, and best criticized on
the grounds that it gave rise to a catastrophic harm in the form of
increased hatred of the United States and better resources and
manpower for terrorist activity. So, this is just to suggest that the
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is coherent, but it
can't work in a case in which its deployment gives rise to a cata-
strophic harm of its own.
Now turn to global warming. Those who think we ought not
to be taking very expensive steps to avert global warming have, as
the best arrow in their quiver, the suggestion that those very steps
give rise to risk of catastrophic harm. This argument would be
plausible if the cost of reducing global warming significantly were
so high that it would produce mass unemployment and poverty.
But in a context in which there is a catastrophic harm on one side
and no catastrophic harm introduced by reducing it, then we have
an argument for the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle.
I want to be a little more concrete about all this by introduc-
ing a couple of suggestions for the use of the Catastrophic Harm
Precautionary Principle. The first is that even for the Cata-
strophic Harm Precautionary Principle, the cost matters. If it
costs a fortune to eliminate a catastrophic harm, that's different
from if you can eliminate the catastrophic harm at essentially zero
cost. The second thing to say about the Catastrophic Harm Pre-
cautionary Principle is, we want to know who is being protected
from catastrophic harm and who is paying the cost of eliminating
catastrophic harm. In the context of global warming, it's just the
case that the United States has probably relatively little to fear
from global warming. First, because our economy does not depend
fundamentally on agriculture, 44 and second because we're rich
and can adapt pretty well.45 So even in the worst-case scenarios
for global warming, the United States is probably not at severe
risk. Poor countries, on the other hand, for which agriculture is
44. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 69-98 (2000).
45. See id. at 96-98.
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everything, are in very severe danger.46 They have a risk of eco-
nomic devastation, of very serious human health problems, and
they don't have the wealth to respond to the risk.47 Global warm-
ing is plausibly seen (it's not typically analyzed in these terms, but
it's plausibly seen in these terms), as a kind of tort imposed by
wealthy countries on poor ones through their global greenhouse
gas emissions. And that has to bear on the analysis of what the
obligations of wealthy countries are.
If we bear that in mind, we are well on the way to develop-
ing-to tie all bits of the argument together-an Irreversible and
Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. The principle could
be used for the context of global warming-suggesting that while
the Kyoto Protocol was imperfect, other approaches would make
sense as a way of combating global warming. Consider an ap-
proach that would require general and broad participation by In-
dia and China, as well as by Germany and Russia and the United
States. Such an approach might give a permit for greenhouse gas
emissions to poor countries because they need them in order to
have their economies grow. Poor countries would be allowed to
sell their emissions rights to the United States, which has more
money-and that would be good on distributional grounds, be-
cause it would help the poor. A sensible approach would have in-
creasing intensity of reductions over time, so it doesn't cause
massive poverty and unemployment in the short run, but allows
reductions to occur with increasing severity as technology
changes. In the United States, we might have a kind of cap-and-
trade system, where we cap our carbon dioxide emissions, or
greenhouse contributions generally, and allow trading internally.
Some system of this general kind would work; it wouldn't
bankrupt us; it would be a response to the tort-like character of
the current situation; and it would adopt not a general idea of pre-
caution, but precaution in this particular context of catastrophic
and irreversible risk.
I'm just about done. My first and negative submission has
been that the precautionary principle is incoherent. It forbids the
very steps that it requires. My second argument has been that the
precautionary principle gives the illusion of coherence because
human minds naturally fixate on a subset of risks that human
beings encounter, and so the precautionary principle operates
46. See id. at 69-98.
47. See id. at 98.
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with disregard for the other risks that are inevitably part of social
situations and that are sometimes introduced by precautions
themselves. The Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle,
which maybe underlies the Endangered Species Act,48 is coherent.
To evaluate it, we have to know the magnitude of the risk that the
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle is combating. The Cat-
astrophic Harm Precautionary Principle is coherent. The major
qualification is that we have to make sure that our steps that are
reducing catastrophic harm aren't themselves introducing cata-
strophic harm.
So my main suggestion has been that to operate sensibly, any
counsel for precaution has to be attentive to the full range of con-
sequences, not simply to a subset of them. But suitably modified,
a precautionary principle focused on irreversibility and potential
catastrophe deserves a prominent place not only in the law of en-
vironmental protection, but in the everyday life of human beings.
Thank you.
48. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2000).
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